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PUBLIC BUDGETING & FIN. MNGMT., 8(2), 150-169 SUMMER 1996 
THE EFFECT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AID ON CITY 
PROPERTY TAXES: NEW RESULTS FOR MINNESOTA 
John R. Bartle 
ABSTRACT. An earlier study found that certain Minnesota state aid programs 
stimulated city property tax levies to a high degree. If this is accurate, it 
suggests potentially serious problems with state property tax relief efforts. This 
article re-examines this question and finds that most aid programs have little 
direct effect on property tax levies. However, certain aid formulas that reduce 
the effective price of property taxes do indirectly stimulate property taxes. 
Therefore, states need to be careful in designing aid programs intended to 
reduce property taxes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In presenting results on the different effects of Minnesota state aid 
programs, Bell and Bowman (1987) found that a state homeowner 
property tax credit had a stimulative effect on city property tax levies 
while state lump-sum aid to cities had a positive but insignificant effect 
on tax levies. They argued that this result was due in part to the 
substitution and income effects of the former program in contrast to the 
income effect of the latter. The irony of these findings is that both 
*John R. Bartle is an Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the 
University of Nebraska at Omaha. His teaching and research interests 
are in the areas of public finance and budgeting. He holds a doctorate 
from the Ohio State University. 
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programs have property tax relief as their goal, but instead apparently 
stimulate higher property taxes. Bell and Bowman (1987: 293) wrote, 
"These findings are consistent with the notion that a bloating of the 
public sector results from divorcing the pain of taxation from the 
pleasure of spending." 
Their findings are important for policy design. If policies designed 
to reduce local property taxes have the perverse effect of increasing 
them, then this suggests a serious need for reform. More generally, 
findings that aid programs have varying fiscal impacts may suggest ways 
that policymakers can fine-tune the grants-in-aid system to get the results 
they seek. 
This paper re-examines Bell and Bowman's results for Minnesota 
and extends and corrects their work. Then a simultaneous equation 
model is presented to allow more detailed examination of city tiscal 
response to aid. This paper proceeds as follows: first the aid programs 
are described, followed by a literature review. Then the relevant 
variables are operationalized, the econometric issues are discussed and 
Bell and Bowman's model is re-estimated. Then a comprehensive model 
of city budgets is estimated, followed by a conclusion. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE AID PROGRAMS 
Several aid programs are examined here. Minnesota's local govern-
ment aid program (LGA) is a form of lump-sum aid that attempts to 
substitute state resources for local property taxes, and to distribute funds 
to counter disparities in local tax effort and tax capacity (Bell, 1986). In 
fiscal year 1987, cities received $296 million from this program, about 
$69 per capita (Carlson, 1988). Until 1988, the homestead credit 
directly reduced homeowners' property tax bills by 54% up to a $700 
maximum. The state reimbursed local taxing authorities for the tax 
relief. This aid is effectively a form of matching aid for the entire 
budget of local governments. The program cost the state $582 million 
in fiscal year 1987, or $137 per capita. Cities received $116 million of 
the total (Carlson, 1988; Minnesota Department of Revenue, 1987). In 
1988 the Minnesota Legislature changed the homestead credit design, 
rolling the credit into the state property tax classification system. As a 
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result, the credit is now part of a more generous calculation of the 
taxable valuation of homes, and so no longer has the matching aid effect. 
Minnesota's property tax refund, or "circuit breaker" program is 
paid to both homeowners and renters based on their household income 
and property tax paid. The program acts as a refund where the state 
sends the claimant a check for property taxes already paid. In fiscal year 
1987 total payments wen:l $156 million or $37 per capita (Minnesota 
Department of Revenue, 1987). 
Minnesota state highway aid is distributed to municipalities based 
on population and need, as determined by the Minnesota Department of 
Transportation. Other state and local aid to cities fund police, fire, 
airports, community development, health, project grants, and aid to cities 
in taconite mining areas. 
Federal aid is composed of many different aid programs. Two of 
the largest during this perilod for these cities are general revenue sharing 
(GRS) and community development block grants (CDBG). Other federal 
aid includes grants for sewage, airports, health and project grants. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Bell and Bowman (1987) examined the effect of aid on local 
property tax levies. They found that total federal aid was significant, 
ranging from .11 to .16 in three specifications. State LGA was positive 
but not significant and the homestead credit was significant, ranging from 
1.14 to 1.33. 
There are relatively t~~w articles focusing on state intergovernmental 
aid other than Bell and Bowman's. Most examine the effect of aid on 
spending rather than taxes. Ladd and Yinger (1989) looked at the 
spending effect of total state aid on several U.S. cities and reported a 
significant .32 effect on current city spending. Simonsen (1994) found 
that a state aid variable consisting largely of highway aid had no effect 
on either capital or current spending for Oregon cities. 
A few studies have looked at the effect of state aid on the revenue 
side. Stine (1994) found that increases in total state aid (mostly matching 
categorical aid) had no significant effect on either own-source revenues 
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or property taxes for Pennsylvania counties. However the aid response 
was asymmetric; aid increases had no effect but aid decreases were 
associated with an increase of .19 in local own-source revenue and .09 
in property taxes. Examining a pooled data set of 39 U.S. cities over 17 
years, Bartle (1995) found that state general purpose aid reduced city 
property taxes by .43 per dollar of aid and increased capital spending by 
.18. Categorical state aid caused a small (. 07) increase in city non-
property taxes and increased both current (. 72) and capital (.12) spending 
for a total spending increase of .84. 
With the exception of the Bell and Bowman article, the effect of aid 
on revenues ranged from .07 to -.43 and the effects of aid on spending 
ranged from zero to .84.. The positive effect of aid on property taxes 
that Bell and Bowman found differs from most other findings. In 
particular, the coefficients for the homeowner credit are very high. 
OPERA TIONALIZING THE MODEL 
Following Bell and Bowman, the dependent variable for the first 
two models is city net property tax levy per capita (NPTLPC), which is 
the city tax levy net of the homestead credit amount received by the city. 
The third model is a simultaneous equation model with five different 
dependent variables. 
Drawing from Inman (1979), a median voter model is derived 
demonstrating the effect of each of these aid programs on both the full 
fiscal income and the tax price of the median voter. (1) These two 
variables in turn affect the demand for public goods and hence the tax 
levy. Other variables influencing city tax levy are: the preferences of the 
median voter, before-tax income, and resident share of the property tax 
base. 
Aid Variables 
In this model, aid programs affect net city levy either through the 
tax price of the median voter or her full fiscal income. The matching or 
refund percentages of the homestead credit, circuit breaker and other 
matching aid affect tax price, while the dollar amount of these and other 
aid programs affect full fiscal income. 
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Lump sum aid affects only the income of the median voter. It is 
represented here by two programs, the per capita amount received from 
Minnesota's LGA program (LGAPC) and the per capita amount of state 
highway aid received (HYRPC). The state highway aid formula is based 
on demographic and other variables and so is essentially a type of lump 
sum aid. The predicted effect of lump sum aid on both public and 
private goods is positive. Public goods can be increased by increasing 
city spending while an increase in spending on private goods requires a 
tax reduction. Where net property tax levy is the dependent variable, the 
expected coefficients for lump sum aid programs is negative. It is 
possible that they might be zero, which implies that all of the aid funds 
the other portions of the budget: spending and non-property tax relief. 
It is not expected that the coefficients would be positive. This would 
imply that the full amount of the aid plus the added amount indicated by 
the positive coefficient is funding spending and non-property tax relief. 
The effect of the homestead credit on the median voter's income is 
captured by the variable CREDPC, per capita homestead credit payments 
to the city. Like lump sum aid, it is expected to have a negative effect 
on the net city tax levy because city taxes must be reduced for this aid 
to fund private spending. The effect of the credit on tax price is 
discussed below. Circuit breaker payments net out the homestead credit 
received by homeowners. The variable CBNETPC is the per capita 
amount of these payments to city residents. The anticipated effect of the 
circuit breaker is different from that of other aid programs. Since this 
refund is paid directly to individuals rather than to the city, it should 
have a positive effect on taxes of between zero and one and a similar 
impact on spending. 
Per capita amounts of other aid programs are represented by two 
variables: federal aid (F AID PC) and other state and local aid 
(OTHRPC), each representing several aid programs which are both 
matching and non-matching in nature. While the matching aid programs 
affect tax price, data on the collective effect of their matching rates are 
not available and so are not included in the tax price variable. Instead 
these variables represent both the income and price effect of the aid. 
Thus, their effect on city tax levies should be higher than that of lump 
sum aid. Where the matching aid rates are high, these coefficients may 
be zero or positive. 
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Tax price is affected by the homestead credit percentage and the 
circuit breaker refund percentage. The tax price variable is constructed 
as follows: 
PRICE = 1 -[(.54* PHBMC)+(CBNET/CBQTAX)] 
where 0.54 is the portion of the property tax bill paid by the state (up 
to the maximum), 
PHBMC is the percentage of homes below the maximum credit, 
CBNET is the net amount of circuit breaker payment to city 
residents and CBQT AX is total qualifying property tax payments 
(including rent).<2l 
PRICE measures the combined effective subsidy rate for both aid 
programs, inclusive of both renters and homeowners. It uses the 
citywide average tax price as the price facing the median voter, although 
any particular person in the city may face a different tax price. It is 
hypothesized that PRICE will have a negative influence on net property 
tax leviesYl 
Other Variables 
Following Bell and Bowman (1987), and Bradbury, Ladd, Perrault, 
Reschovsky and Yinger (1984), the preferences of the median voter are 
operationalized using several variables to represent the demand or 
preferences of the median voter. POLD is the percentage of the city 
population over 65 years of age and PYOUNG is the percentage under 
18. PPOOR is the percentage under the poverty level and POWNOC is 
the percentage of occupied housing units that are owner occupied. <4l It 
is expected that cities with high proportions of population groups 
benefiting disproportionately from municipal services, such as children, 
may have greater demands on local spending and taxes, while cities with 
populations benefiting less, such as the elderly, would demand lower 
taxes and services. Thus PYOUNG should have a positive effect on 
spending and taxes while POLD should be negative. Homeowners feel 
the property tax more directly than do renters, so POWNOC should have 
a negative influence on property taxes. The influence of the poor on city 
taxes and spending is unclear due to two conflicting considerations. On 
the one hand they probably need a higher level of services, but on the 
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other they may be less able to pay for these services. Thus the sign for 
this variable is ambiguous. 
Before-tax income ils represented by per capita income (PCINC), 
which should have a positive effect on the tax levy. The influence of the 
resident's share of the property tax base is captured in the variable 
OMEQPC. This variable measures the per capita amount of property 
taxes that would be raised by one mill, and is expected to have a positive 
coefficient. No variable is included for the cost of local public goods 
here; it is assumed to b1~ constant across these cities during this time 
period. 
The effect of tax exporting is included here, following Bell and 
Bowman. They hypothesized that cities with higher percentages of 
taxable property value in commercial and industrial property would be 
able to "export" part of the property taxes on this property, thus creating 
a positive influence on city property taxes. The same question is 
analyzed here using the variable COMBAS, a measure of the 
composition of the property tax base. <5J 
ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
Bell and Bowman (1987) presented three different specifications for 
1983. The aid effects have been noted above. In addition, they found 
that property tax capacity was positive and significant in each case. The 
property tax base composition variable gave mixed evidence of tax 
exporting. The influence of their tax price variable was negative as 
expected. The results for the demographic variables found PYOUNG to 
be positive and generally significant, POLD to be jnsignificant, 
POWNOC to be negative and significant, and PPOOR to be positive and 
significant. These influences are generally consistent with the expected 
signs. 
Gramlich (1970) has warned of two econometric problems in 
research on intergovernmental grants. First is the choice between cross-
section and time-series data sets. In cross-section studies the structure 
may not be constant across the units of observation and also the study 
may be unduly influenced by the choice of the time period. Gramlich 
(1970: 579) suggests, "[a] good way to circumvent the latter problems 
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is to estimate pooled, cross-section regressions." Second, he points out 
the potential for simultaneous equation bias. "It is certainly true that 
grants affect state and local expenditures, but it may also be true that 
expenditures affect grants" (Gramlich, 1970: 581). He suggests using 
either instrumental variables or simultaneous equation systems to address 
this problem. He points out that both of these problems are likely to 
lead to overestimates of the effect of grants. 
The Bell and Bowman (1987) study is open to both of these chal-
lenges. First, it is a cross-section study for 1983 only. Second, some 
of the aid programs examined are, by design, related to city tax levies. 
In particular, it has been suggested that because the formula for the 
distribution of LGA and the homestead credit is based in part on city tax 
levies, any correlation between levies and aid is a result of these 
formulas rather than behavioral responses to the programs.<6l This may 
also be true for the circuit breaker variable because local governments 
and taxpayers may take the refund into account when making their 
decisions about local taxes. Further, the circuit breaker, state highway 
aid and other state aid were omitted from the Bell and Bowman study. 
The excluded variables should be included to eliminate the possibility of 
specification bias. Therefore in re-estimating Bell and Bowman's 
equation, careful examination of the problems of the stability of the 
cross-section estimates, simultaneity and specification bias need to be 
done. 
The data source used here is the same, the cities included are almost 
identical and the time period of this study is 1984 to 1988 while Bell and 
Bowman used 1983. Because of the time element introduced, all fiscal 
variables are in real do!iars per capita. <7J 
The equations were initially estimated in separate cross-sections, but 
because the parameter estimates were relatively stable, it was appropriate 
to pool the data. This yielded substantially higher F-values and lower 
standard errors. In a pooled model, one option is to add dummy 
variables for time and space, transforming the model into a fixed effects 
model. Some testing of these models was done, but in the end a model 
without any dummy variables was chosen. The dummy variables for the 
years were not significant. When dummy variables were added for the 
cities, the adjusted R-squared rose from .602 to .957 indicating that a 
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substantial improvement in explanatory power was possible. However, 
this model changed the signs of PYOUNG and PRICE in unanticipated 
directions and rendered several of the other variables insignificant. 
Therefore, the more parsimonious yet powerful model without dummy 
variables was accepted. 
To address the problem of simultaneity, instrumental variables were 
created for CREDPC, LGAPC and CBNETPC using exogenous 
variables. The instrument for the credit variable (CREDIVPC) was 
constructed with total residential market value and the percentage of the 
homes below the maximum credit. The instrumental variable for LGA 
(LGAIVPC) was created with three exogenous variables related to the aid 
formula: total city taxable value, population and population squared. The 
circuit breaker instrumental variable (CBIVPC) was constructed with two 
variables that are part of the aid formula: the number of filers and the 
qualifying property tax amounts for the refund. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents two sets of results. Model 1 is a pooled model 
very similar to Bell and Bowman's model. It shows a positive and 
significant effect of OMEQPC as expected. For the aid variables, 
FAIDPC is not significant, while both LGAPC and CREDPC are 
positive and significant. CREDPC is especially high, at 1.277. Both 
coefficients are quite close to those estimated by Bell and Bowman, 
although LGA was not significant and F AID PC was significant in their 
research. The coefficient for PRICE is negative and significant as 
predicted. For the demographic variables, POWNOC takes the expected 
negative sign, indicating the relative reluctance of homeowners to choose 
higher property taxes. PYOUNG is positive and significant as expected, 
while POLD is insignificant. PPOOR, whose predicted sign was 
ambiguous, is positive and significant. Finally, COMBAS, the tax 
exporting variable, is positive and significant as predicted. 
In another regression, the instrumental variables for LGA and the 
credit were introduced with no other changes. The homestead credit 
coefficient changed from 1.277 to -.161, significant in both cases, while 
the LGA coefficient changed in value from .174 to -.345, again 
significant in both cases. These changes in sign reverse the earlier 
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TABLE 1 
Two Models Explaining Net Property Tax Levy Per Capita 
Expected Sign Model 1 Model 2 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intercept -52.245* -8 .880 
(19. 750) (40.022) 
OMEQPC + 15.703* 19.262* 
(.477) (1.843) 
FAIDPC 01+ .012 .055 
(.012) (.045) 
LG APC/LGAIVPC .174* .055 
(.053) (. 157) 
CREDPC/CREDIVPC 1.277* -.234 
(.116) (.227) 
CBIVPC + .374* 
(.185) 
HYRPC -.020 
(. 100) 
OTHRPC 01+ .130 
(.124) 
PRICE -41.020* -71.721 * 
(7.822) (24 .795) 
PCINC + -4.326* 
(1.427) 
POWNOC -.764* -.080 
(.167) (.384) 
PYOUNG + 2.220* 1.377* 
(.323) (.671) 
POLD -.074 .946 
(.255) (.489) 
PPOOR ? 2.676* 1.931 * 
(.386) (.771) 
COMBAS + .603* .174 
(.144) (.280) 
N 880 311 
R-squared .6061 .5143 
Adjusted R-squared .6016 .4914 
F 133.886 22.46 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; and 
* Indicates significant at the .95 confidence level. 
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conclusion by Bell and Bowman. They indicate that the effect of both 
aid programs work as hypothesized here, reducing rather than increasing 
local tax levies. The tax price variable stayed negative and significant 
and F AID PC was still insignificant. 
Several other variables are included in Model 2. Because the data 
available on the circuit breaker are limited to 104 cities from 1984 to 
1986, the number of observations drops substantially. <Sl The capacity 
variable, OMEQPC stays positive and significant. F AID PC is still not 
significant. LGAIVPC and CREDIVPC lose their significance, suggest-
ing that their effect on property taxes may be zero rather than negative. 
CBIVPC is positive and significant as expected, indicating that about a 
third of this aid finds its way from refund recipients' pockets into higher 
property taxes. Neither HYRPC nor OTHRPC is significant. PRICE 
continues to be negative and significant. PCINC takes on an unexpected 
negative sign. POWNOC loses its significance but keeps its expected 
negative sign. The sign and significance of PYOUNG and PPOOR are 
unchanged and POLO changes sign but stays insignificant. COMBAS 
becomes insignificant. 
The results for the aid coefficients are more consistent with what 
theory predicts. A negative impact of aid on net levies indicates that 
some part of the aid goes into the private sector. High positive and 
significant coefficients suggest that all of the aid plus additional local 
sources of revenue are captured by the city. Over the long run this 
cannot be explained by the standard model of grants. This suggests that 
Bell and Bowman's results for the homestead credit and LGA were over-
stated because of the simultaneity with the dependent variable, leading 
to erroneous conclusions about the effect of these aid programs on local 
property tax levies. 
A MODEL OF CITY BUDGETS 
Moving beyond the Bell and Bowman study, the full budgetary 
impact of the aid programs is examined to tell a more complete story 
about the effect of aid on city budgets. Until now, the on! y dependent 
variable has been property tax levies, so we have been unable to tell how 
aid affects other parts of city budgets. 
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This approach runs six related regressions. The dependent variables 
are: total current spending (TCEPC), total capital spending (TKEPC), 
"other spending" (OTHEXPC -- composed of fund transfers, debt 
service, debt redemption, and the difference between total revenues and 
total expenditures), property tax revenues (PTAXPC), borrowing and 
transfers (BORTRNPC), and other revenues less intergovernmental 
revenues (OTHREVPC ··- composed of local sales and lodging taxes, 
special assessments, tax increment revenues, fines, licenses, permits, 
fees, charges and interest). 
Because of the relationship between the dependent variables, more 
efficient estimates are possible if a system of six equations are estimated 
(Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 1981). The seemingly unrelated regression model 
(SUR) used takes into account the correlation of the error terms that 
arises because of the relationship among the dependent variables. 
The construction of these dependent variables account for all city 
funds other than aid revenues. By construction, the net impact on these 
budget categories should equal the total for each aid program. Thus the 
sum of the aid coefficients across all six equations should equal one. A 
test of the hypothesis that the sum of the coefficients is one was 
performed. For the circuit breaker the examination is not appropriate 
because the funds are paid to individuals rather than to governments. 
These tests of the hypothesis were not rejected for LGA, federal aid, 
highway aid and other state aid, but was rejected for the homestead 
credit. 
Three features of this model should be noted. First, the property 
tax variable used here (PT AXPC) is different from the per capita tax 
levy because of the timing of property tax payments and because of the 
unique property tax base sharing law affecting cities in the Minneapolis-
Saint Paul metropolitan area. PT AXPC is used here because it better fits 
in the budgetary model. Second, the instrumental variables LGAIVPC, 
CREDIVPC and CBIVPC are used only in the property tax equation. As 
the other dependent variables are not mechanically related to these aid 
programs, the regular values of these three aid variables are used in the 
other equations to allow for more precise estimates. Third, OMEQPC 
is not present in the OTHREVPC and BORTRNPC equations and 
COMBAS is not present in the TCEPC, TKEPC and OTHEXPC 
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equations because there is no theoretical reason for these two variables 
to influence the respective dependent variables. 
Table 2 presents Model 3. The results for the aid variables find 
that a dollar of federal aid funds both capital spending and other 
spending. While none of the effects on the revenue side are significant 
for this variable, borrowing and transfers is close and helps explain the 
spending response. LGA funds current spending on approximately a 
one-for-one basis and has no other significant effects. The homestead 
credit is associated with a very large amount of both current and other 
spending, as well as non··property tax revenues. There is no indication 
of any property tax stimulation. 
The results for the circuit breaker indicate a very large (1.394) 
response in current spending as well as a positive response in borrowing 
and transfers. It would seem unlikely that this much of the aid would be 
shifted to the public sector. However, the high standard errors do 
indicate that more plausible amounts are within the confidence intervals. 
Each dollar of highway aid is associated with approximately equal 
amounts of borrowing/transfers and capital spending. These results are 
sensible, since much of this aid is designed to fund capital spending and 
the issuance and redemption of debt for this function. Other state and 
local aid funds current spending on a dollar-for-dollar basis, and also 
stimulates other revenues. The tax price coefficient remains negative and 
significant in the property tax equation and also has a negative influence 
on current spending. 
The tax capacity variable (OMEQPC) and per capita income give 
the expected results, except for the negative influence of PCINC on 
property tax revenues. 1he tax exporting variable (COMBAS) now has 
an unexpected negative effect on property taxes and significant effects on 
the other two revenue variables. 
The demographic variables tell an interesting story. In the property 
tax equation POWNOC continues to be negative and is significant as 
expected. Elsewhere it is not significant. PYOUNG remains positive 
and significant in the property tax equation and also has positive effects 
on other revenues and capital spending. This is a reasonable result 
because one would expect a variety of capital needs in cities with larger 
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TABLE 2 
Model 3: Pooled SUR Model, 1984-1986 (N=311) 
Dependent Parameter Estimates (Standard Error) 
Variables 
PTAXPC OTHREVPC BORTRNPC TCEPC TKEPC OTHEXPC 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Intercept 76.56 -167.76 162.98 -33.72 54.57 90.45 
(43.47) (86.58) (201) (69.6) (95.2) (194.9) 
OMEQPC 19.98* 15.60* -.51 8.25 
(1.97) (2.92) (4.16) (4.55) 
FAIDPC .034 .156 .485 .164 .913* .595* 
(.049) (.109) (.270) (.095) (.130) (.267) 
LGAPC/ .128 -.201 -.406 1.260* -.034 -.583 
LGAIVPC (.159) (.224) (.552) (.188) (.264) (.543) 
CREDPC/ -.245 2.166* .994 3.207* .686 2.100* 
CREDIVPC (.229) (.441) (1.074) (.370) (.520) (1.058) 
CBNETPC/ .376 .435 2.513* 1.394* -.475 1.757 
CBIVPC (.196) (.459) (1.136) (.400) (.551) (1.124) 
HYRPC -.016 .416 1.235* 0.356 1.275* 1.033 
(.111) (.246) (.608) (.216) (.295) (.602) 
OTHRPC .166 .635* .984 1.017* .657 .916 
(.137) (.304) (.753) (.269) (.367) (.746) 
PRICE -81.50* -59.95 4.42 -82.6* -70.4 45.4 
(26.27) (45.59) (112.7) (39.8) (54.4) (111.5) 
PCINC -3.80* 12.85* 13.29* 4.88 7.47* 7.54 
(thousands) (1.53) (2.25) (5.51) (2.49) (3.46) (5.95) 
POWNOC -.82* -.64 -3.03 -1.31 -1.75 -2.19 
(.41) (.85) (1.98) (.69) (.938) (1.92) 
PYOUNG 1.46* 5.42* 3.43 2.80 4.82* 2.57 
(.74) (1.66) (4.10) (1.45) (1.98) (4.06) 
POLD 1.00 -7.50* -5.15 -2.83* -3.25* -6.38* 
(.54) (1.30) (3.22) (1.13) (1.55) (3.19) 
PPOOR .93 2.64 -0.76 3.22 0.31 -1.08 
(.85) (1. 90) (4.71) (1.67) (2.28) (4.66) 
COMB AS -.80* 2.92* -1.96* 
(.29) (.54) (.63) 
System R-squared=.6403 
* Indicates significant at the .95 confidence level. 
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proportions of children. POLD has a negative and significant effect on 
all spending categories, as well as on other revenues, suggesting that the 
elderly exert pressure to keep local spending down. Finally, PPOOR has 
no significant effects. 
DISCUSSION 
This research corre,;:ted Bell and Bowman's study for simultaneity 
and found that the homestead credit and LGA fund current spending but 
do not directly stimulate additional property taxes. The negative effect 
of the tax price variable on property taxes agrees with their results and 
suggests that the homestead credit and the circuit breaker as designed 
have an important indirect effect on local tax decisions by reducing the 
local tax price residents perceive. 
The circuit breaker program may have a positive effect on property 
taxes and also funds public spending. This finding provides new 
evidence relevant to the persistent question of the "flypaper effect." This 
type of aid appears to more easily find its way into the public sector than 
does private income. Although the money in this case does not "stick 
where it hits," recipients and cities may be quicker to perceive it as 
"public money" than other sources of private income. 
Aggregate federal aid, state highway aid, and other state and local 
aid have no significant effects on property taxes, but fund the type of 
spending anticipated and do so in large proportions. In all these cases 
a dollar of aid funds at least a dollar of spending. 
Property tax capac:ity is a consistently important variable in 
explaining property tax !~:vets. Per capita income does the same for non-
property tax revenues and capital spending, although is curiously 
negative for property taxes. The results on tax exporting are mixed. 
The demographic variables generally behave as expected. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The influence of the tax price variable indicates the importance of 
state aid design on local fiscal behavior. Other things equal, property 
taxes are higher in those cities where state aid programs reduce the local 
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marginal tax price. This suggests that programs such as the pre-reform 
homestead credit and the circuit breaker that are meant to reduce 
property taxes actually help stimulate these taxes. While certain types 
of aid are designed to increase spending on certain functions, it is hard 
to imagine that it would be desirable to create this incentive for the entire 
local budget. 
The Minnesota legislation that removed the tax price incentive effect 
of the homestead credit should have beneficial effects. While it retains 
the desired subsidy to homeowners, the program has been redesigned so 
that it does not reduce local tax prices, and therefore should not stimulate 
property taxes. However the circuit breaker effect on tax price is still 
present, and if enough residents of a city receive large tax reductions 
from this program, the incentive to increase property taxes would still 
remain. 
In contrast to the stimulative effect of the tax price on local levies, 
aid programs with only income effects either had a zero or negative net 
effect on city tax levies. This is further evidence that the design of aid 
programs is important in the ultimate fiscal impact of the program. 
Instead, these aid programs funded a dollar or more of spending for 
every dollar of aid received. This finding differs from those of previous 
studies that find both matching and lump sum aid programs to have small 
spending effects and larger tax reduction effects (U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, 1985; Ladd & Yinger, 1989; Fisher, 1996). 
Methodologically, these results underscore Gramlich's caution of 
more than twenty years ago that empirical work on the effects of grants 
on budgets must be careful to control for simultaneity. 
Financial aid to cities is a crucial part of our federal system. Aid 
may take a variety of forms, and these findings indicate that differences 
in program design affect local fiscal choice. Identifying the effects of aid 
on local finances and behavior continues to be part of the research 
agenda. Similar studies for other states could inform us about the effects 
of different types of aid programs on local budgets. Policymakers may 
then be able to craft aid policies to accomplish their desired objectives, 
guided by the results of such research. 
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NOTES 
1. This derivation is contained in an appendix which is available upon 
request from the author. It is drawn from Bartle ( 1990) and is based 
on Inman (1979). 
2. In model 1 the circuit breaker is not included and instead PRICE is 
specified as: PRICE = 1 - (.54 * PHBMC). 
3. The tax price variable constructed by Bell and Bowman (1987) was 
weighted by the share of city housing that is owner occupied 
(POWNOC). This does not seem warranted, especially where 
POWNOC is a separate independent variable in the regression. The 
price effect of the credit is related only to the credit percentage and 
the share of homes below the credit maximum. Variation in the 
portion of the tax base in rental housing may affect either the ability 
to export taxes or the propensity for voters to favor tax increases, 
but these effects should be accounted for separate! y, not in the 
PRICE variable. In correspondence with Michael Bell, this point 
was made. He responded in part, "we included POWNOC in our 
definition of price to provide for a weighing for how important the 
price variable is likely to be in the political decisionmaking process 
in each local jurisdiction. Perhaps an alternative way of accounting 
for this variation across municipalities ... would be to include a 
separate independent variable in the regression measuring the percent 
of homes that are owner occupied." This step is exactly what Bell 
and Bowman did, and what was done here. 
4. POLD, PYOUNG and POWNOC are all formed using decennial 
Census data for 1980, 1990 and interpolating the values for 1984 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
EFFECT OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL AID 167 
through 1988. For PPOOR, data for 1990 were not available at the 
time this research commenced, so the values for all years were set 
equal to the 1980 figure. 
5. The tax exporting variable differs from that used by Bell and 
Bowman. It does not break out commercial and industrial property 
separate! y and instead is equal to the rental, commercial and 
industrial share of total property value. In Bell and Bowman's study 
it was defined as the apartment, commercial, industrial and 
seasonal/recreational share of the tax base. The main difference here 
is the addition of rented homes in COMBAS. 
6. John Tomlinson, former Assistant Commissioner for Tax Policy of 
the Minnesota Department of Revenue, wrote: 
The Bell/Bowman study shows that there is a correlation between 
city HC [homestead credit] per capita and city net levy per capita. 
But the distribution formula for HC ... makes such a correlation 
inevitable.... The situation [concerning LGA] is similar to the 
homestead credit situation; the factors shown by Bell/Bowman to 
be correlated (net city levy per capita and LGA per capita) are in 
the basic LGA formula. Thus the two factors are bound to be 
correlated. Bell & Bowman claim that correlation shows LGA per 
capita causes levy per capita. I contend that it is the other way 
around -- levy per capita causes LGA per capita, since that is the 
way the LGA formula works. 
7. Data to construct both tax price variables were available only for 
1986 and 1988. For 1987 PRICE was an average of 1986 and 1988; 
1984 and 1985 values were set equal to the 1986 figure. 
8. Because only summary data on the circuit breaker were available for 
1986, data for each <:ity were constructed from statewide data for 
1986 and city data for 1985. From 1985 to 1986 the number of 
filers statewide dropped by 2.3% and total payments increased by 
2.36%. Thus each city's 1986 filer number was calculated as 97.7% 
of that in 1985 and circuit breaker payments were 102.36% of the 
city's total in 1985. Available data indicated that total payments 
increased at almost the same rate from 1985 to 1986 between the 
seven-county Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area and the non-
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metropolitan area. If these are representative of the changes for each 
city, then the estimates should be close to the actual. 
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